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Luck and the Enigmas of Fate 
Nicholas Rescher 
1. Luck and the Unexpected 
ln the early morning hours of 9 August 1945, the B-29 bomber "Bock's Car," piloted by 
Army Air Corps Major Charles W. Sweeney, left the American airfield on Tm.ian island 
in the Pacific bound for the arsenal city ofKokura on the nonhem tip of]apan's Kyushu 
island .. In the plane's belly sat "Fat Man," the second atomic bomb readied for military 
use. Three days earlier, the bomber "Enola Gay" had dropped on Hiroshima the first such 
weapon, "Little Boy" - a device constructed on rather different principles. And now 
phase two of the world's greatest physics experiment was about to take place. But matters 
did not go exactly as intended. 
Over Kokura there was considerable cloud cover and haze, and the aiming point was 
obscured. In consequence, Major Sweeney proceeded southwards as per contingency 
plan to the secondary target, the old port city of Nagasaki. The rest, as the saying goes, 
is history. Kokura was a city literally saved by the clouds. And what was an incredible 
piece of good luck for the inhabitants ofKokura turned equally bad for those ofNagasaki. 1 
As individuals, we may never know how lucky we actually are. For all we know, we 
narrowly escape death a dozen times each day-failing to inhale a fatal microbe here, 
and there missing by a hair's breadth the pebble that would cause us to slip and pitch into 
an on rushing bus. Luck, then, is a formidable and ubiquitous factor in human life as we 
know it-a companion that, like it or not, accompanies us all from the cradle and to the 
grave. 
Considering the myriad ways in which luck impinges upon every human life, it is well 
worthwhile to have a closer look at what luck is and what it does. It is dear, to begin with, 
that luck produces unexpected effects: 
The Persian, condemned to lose his tongue, on whom the operation 
was so bunglingly performed that it merely removed an impediment in 
his speech; the painter who produced an effect he had long toiled after 
in vain, by throwing his brush at the picture in a fit of rage and despair 1 
the musical composer, who having exhausted his patience in attempts 
to imitate on the piano a storm at sea, accomplished the precise result 
by angrily extending his hands to the two extremities of the keys, and 
bringing them rapidly together, -all these seem so many fit types of the 
freaks of Fortune by which some men are enriched or made famous by 
their blunders, while others, with ten times the capacity and knowledge, 
are kept at the bottom of her wheel. 2 
Luck is a rogue force that prevents human life from being fully domesticated to rational 
management. Its foothold on the world stage is secure by the power of chance, chaos, and 
choice. Luck and her cousins, fate and fortune, make it somewhere between difficult and 
impossible to conduct our lives successfully through planning and design. Things in this 
world can always go wrong. It was a commonplace among the ancient Greeks that no man 
should be accounted fortunate until after his death. At any stage, disaster may strike to 
upset everything despite all our best efforts and most careful contrivings. As John Dewey 2
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observed, our endurance in the world's course of changes is ever nslcy: 
No one knows what a year or even a day may bring forth. The healchy 
become ill; the rich poor; the mighty are cast down; fame changes to 
obloguy. Men live at the mercy of forces they cannot control. Belief in 
fortune and luck, good or evil, is one of the most widespread and 
persistent of human beliefs. Chance has been deified by many peoples. 
Fate has been set up as an overlord to whom even the Gods must bow. 
Belief in a Goddess of Luck is in ill repute among pious folk but their 
belief in providence is a tribute to the fact no individual controls his 
own destiny. The uncenainry of life and one's final lot has always been 
associated with mutability, while unforeseen and uncontrollable change 
has been Linked with time. . . . For Centuries poets made the 
uncertainty which time brings with it the theme of their discourse­
read Shakespeare's sonnets. Nothing stays; life is fleeting and all 
earthly things are transitory.3 
The temporal aspect is crucial for luck because luclc pivots on impredictabiliry. A world 
in which everything goes according to a discernible plan leaves no room for luck. We 
ourselves, of course, live in a very different sort of world. Things often go well or ill for 
us due to conditions and circumstances that lie wholly beyond our cognitive or 
manipulative control. It was a matter of bad luclc for the Spain of King Philip II when a 
stonn scattered the "Invincible Annada" in the English Channel. Bue it was a matter of 
good luck for Queen Elizabeth's subjects. Luck-good or ill-impinges upon individuals 
and groups alike (think of the Jews of Poland or the passengers on the Titanic) .  There is 
no way of escaping it in this world. le is not just that having children is to give hostages 
to fortune, but having a stake in anything whatsoever. Wherever we invest our hopes and 
goals and objectives- whatever may be our expectations and aspirations and plans -good 
or bad luck can come into opention to realize or frustrate our wishes. Our best laid plans 
"gang aft agley" for reasons entirely beyond our knowledge and control. We play our cards 
as best we can but the outcome depends on what is done by the other players in the system 
- be  they people or nature's forces. Our lives are lived amidst hopes and apprehensions. 
Things can cum out for our weal or our woe in ways that we can neither foresee nor 
control. And it is exactly here that the factor of luck makes its inexorable way into the 
domain of human affairs. Often as not, a person's life is a chain built up by links ofluck. 
The youthful personal influences that inform one's career decisions, the contingencies 
that determine one's employment, the chance encounterers that lead to one's marriage, 
etc. are so many instances of luck. 
The role of chance in human affairs was once the topic of extensive discussion and 
intensive debate among philosophers. In Hellenistic Greece, theorists debated tirelessly 
about the role of eimannene, the unfathomable fate that remorselessly ruled the affairs of 
the men and gods alike, regardless of their wishes and actions. And then there was Fate's 
companion, luck (Tuche). The Church fathers struggled mightily to combat the siren 
appeal of the idea of these superstition#inviting potencies, and Saint Augustine detested 
the very word fate. The issue of good or bad fortune, along with the related question of 
the extent to which we can control our destinies in this world, came co prominence again 
in the Renaissance, when scholars brooded once again about the issues raised by Cicero 
and Augustine. And the topic undoubtedly has a long and lively future before it, since 
it is certain that, as long as human life continues, luck will play a prominent part in its 
3
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Disasters represent a particularly notable fork in che road of fonune because they 
divide those concerned into two: the luclcy and the unlucky, the survivors or victims. 
(Think here of the aristocrats of the French revolution, the European Jews ofH itler' s day, 
che kulaks small farmers of Stalin's USSR. or the passengers of a plane that crashes or a 
ship that founders in a storm.) When disaster strikes we face a stampede, as it were, that 
impels us along willy nilly one way or the other - the way of the lucky and that of the 
unlucky. It is a recognition of the role ofluck, more than any other single thing, that leads 
us to appreciate the contingency of human triumphs and disasters. "There but for some 
stroke ofluck go I" is a humbling thought whose contemplation is salutary for us all. The 
trenchant question of old (posed by unfortunate and fortunate ones alike) is: Why me? 
What have I done to deserve this? The irony of course is that the appropriate and correct 
answer is: nothing. It is simply a matter of chance--of fortuitous luck. To be sure, given 
our natural human commitment to the idea that we live in a rational world we are 
inclined co think-that there is always an ultimate reason why-a cogent explanation 
seems necessary. And when things go wrong we ha.ve a sense of guilt and burden: Why 
have I been selected? When things go well, we ask: What must I now do co prove myself 
worthy? All of this is perfectly natural but also totally futile. The only ultimately rational 
attitude is to sit loose in the saddle of life and to come to terms with the idea of chance 
as such. 
In a world in which we must live our lives amidst some degree of uncertainty-in 
which for any of a thousand reasons the consequences of our actions and inactions are 
substantially beyond our predictive reach-a reliance on luck is to some extent 
inevitable. Our activities can make proposals to the world, but their consequences for 
good or bad are almost outside the range of our knowledge and control. Be it for good or 
bad, what actually happens to people is all too often a matter of luck. 
Like an unexpected inheritance, luck generally comes to us unexpectedly, '"out of the 
blue." Sometimes to be sure we take preliminary and preparatory steps to put ourselves 
in luck's way. You cannot win the lottery without obtaining a ticket or make money on 
the ponies without placing a bee. Sometimes we have to be in the right place at the right 
time. But often there is little or nothing you need to do. To have a narrow escape, for 
example, you simply have to avoid-by a sufficiently narrow margin-being at the wrong 
place at the wrong time. 
It is often luck alone that determines the status ,and significance of our actions. Was 
that leap in the dark a stroke of genius or the beginning of the end? Was John's confession 
a futile gesture or a sincere act of expiation? Was Henry's decision to return to the U.S. 
in an effort to prevent Mary's hasty marriage a wise move or a step into disaster? It all 
depends. What descriptions fit an act will depend on the outcome and the outcome all 
to often hinges on how things chance to eventuate-that is, on sheer luck. 
It may be chance alone-or some trivial whim-that determines whether we took the 
Mauritania or the Titanic for our return journey. But which way the decision goes may in 
fact make "all the difference in. the world." In this life we are not masters of our fate­
or rather are so to only a very limited extent. The hand of unforeseen contingency is 
present everywhere. The Greek idea that "character is fate" is deeply problematic in all 
of its versions;� because it is our luck rather than our nature that determines what 
becomes of us in this world to a greater extent than any of us like to admit. Under the 
influence of Epicurean philosophy, various of the ancient Romans saw man as a master 
of his fate. s But a different point of view was also very much astir, one according to which 
we are at the mercy of forces beyond our control; fate has her way with us, willy#nilly.6 4
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"The gods mock us about like balls" said Plautus.; And as JX)ets see ic, we are but coun 
jesters in the realm of Chance, ruled by a despouc monarch whose whun lS our 
command.& Some of the risks we run are of our making but most of them come our way 
not only unwelcome but unbidden and uninvited, being simply unavoidable aspects of 
life in an uncenain and often unfriendly world. 
Often -in lotteries, in marrying an heiress, or in escaping unscathed from an explosion 
thanks to the shielding of somebody else's body- one person's good luck can be attained 
at the cost of another's ill.9 One person's good luck is sometimes another's bad: X loses 
a $ 100 bill� Y finds it-lucky for the latter, unlucky for the former. But of course things 
need not be so-good luck can be victimless. The person who strikes oil on his own Land 
is lucky without being so at anyone else's expense. Life is not a zer<Ysum game that is so 
arranged that the good fortune of some is necessarily secured at the expense of others. 
If by some lucky stroke the world escapes an apocalyptic epidemic�r a nuclear war­
everyone is lucky without any price paid by some unfortunates. 
2. How Luck W orlu 
L.Jc1' as such is a matter of things going well or ill for someone in a situation of uncertainty 
and unforeseeability. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as "the fortuitous 
happening of an event favorable or unfavorable to the interest of a person." 
Lucic is at work when things go right (realize our desires or advance our interests)-or 
the reverse-fortuitously, that is, in circumstances where we have no sufficient basis for 
c.onfidently expecting this because the circumstances disallow our being able to securely 
foresee or c.ontrol the outcome. The fruits ofluck (be they good or bad) are accordingly 
uncenain. Thus if something we cannot {securely) anticipate {let alone unilaterally 
control! )  tum out to our benefit, then we are lucky, and if they tum out to our 
disadvantage, then we are unlucky. We are in a situation where the issue to all intents 
and purposes hinges in chance. 
Typically, good luck. is a matter of having things go right (or fail to go wrong) 
unforeseeably, "by chance". But it need not necessarily be "against the odds." These are 
circumstances where we call people lucky even when the odds are on their side. Smith 
let his fire insurance lapse for a year, and nothing happened. (And this was to be 
expected- only 1 in 200 houses have a fire during the average year in the area where 
he lives.) Again, Jones played Russian Roulette and lived to tell the tale. He too was lucky 
even though only one of the six chambers of his revolver was loaded so that the 
probabilitie.s favored survival. For it was only "by chance" that things turned out well. 
The survivor of a serious accident is lucky even if ·this occurred in circumstances where 
people generally survive (i.e. where survival was likely) , seeing that it was by chance alone 
that our survivor was among the fortunate rather than the unfortunate. Still, when the 
odds are very substantially in their favor and the element of chance is minimal one would 
call people fortunate rather than lucky. A lucky or unlucky event must go against the 
grain of c.onfident predictability and depan from reasonable expectation. The winner of 
a lottery is lucky but the loser who defied precipitous odds though in a way unfortunate­
does not really qualify for a claim to bad luck. "He should have seen it coming"-being 
so probable, it was only to be expected and should have occasioned no surprise. People 
are lucky (or �nluclcy) when positive (or negative} things happen to them in ways that 
could not reasonably have been expected, and luck can be defined as the fortuitous 
happening of events favorable or unfavorable to people's interests. For example, the 
would-be bank robber recognized by the recently transferred security guard who 
5
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wimessed his mosc recent victimization of another branch is distincdy unlucky . 
The unexpectedness that is ac issue with luck is closely bound up with ignorance. If 
you find yourself at a tripartite fork in the road withouc any idea of which of the three 
roads before you is the one thac leads to your destination, then it is improbable (in the 
most objective of ways} that you will pick the right one. Tobe sure, the chanciness bound 
up with ignorance need not be an objective one (it is not really "by chance" that me roads 
lead where chey do.) But your selecting the right one is, in the circumstances, something 
chat will happen by chance. And it is on chis basis that you will be lucky in making the 
right selection. 
3. Luck vs. Fortune 
Luck is a matter of having something good or bad happen that lies outside the horizon 
of effective foreseeability. There is thus a significant difference between luck and fortune. 
You are forcunate if something good happens to or for you, period. But you are lucky if 
something good happens to you despite its being chancy-and particularly so if it occurs 
against the odds and reasonable expectations. A person who has acquired enough money 
robe able to travel first class is fortunate but not lucky in the scricter sense. By contrast, 
the airline passenger who finds lUm.self shifted from coach to first class for the convenience 
of the airline is lucky. Fate and fortune relate to the conditions and circumstances of our 
lives generally, luck to the chancy eventuations that befall us.10 Our innate skills and 
talents are matters of good fortune; the opportunities that chance brings our way to help 
us develop them are for the most part matters of luck. 
Good luck requires that the favorable outcome in view results not by planning or 
foresight but "by inadvertence,,--by causes impenetrable to us, or as the 1613 Lexicon 
Philosophicum of Goclenius put it, "not by the industry, insight, or sagacity of man, but 
by some other, altogether hidden cause" (non ab hominis industria et acumine iudicioque 
depend.ens, sea a causa alia occuluz). Accordingly I luck hinges outcomes on what happens 
by accident rather than by design. With luck, there must be the element of chanciness 
and unforeseeability with its room for surprise. What we know in. advance of the fact is 
not grist for the mill of luck. 
Their falling outside the scope ofluck, strictly speaking, does not render foreseeable, 
unchancy goods are any the less welcome or foreseeable, unchancy negativities any the 
less unwelcome. Suppose that we discover that a large but heretofore undetected meteor 
is on a collision course with the earth. Humanity's fate is sealed, the handwriting is on 
the wall. By a fixed number of days hence, the earth will be covered by an impenetrable 
cloud of debris and will become unable to sustain mammalian life. What a catastrophe! 
In these circumstances, however, humanity's fate is (strictly speaking) unfortunate 
rather than unlucky. It wasfarrunaLe for John Doe that he owned a pen,knife. But it was 
lucky for him that he happened to have it along on the day he needed it to deal with a 
snake bite. (He didn't generally carry the knife, but just by chance took it with him on 
that particular day.) 
And so while we can (in certain circumstances) be fortunare to be red, headed (say 
when this makes one eligible for some benefit or other) , one cannot be lucky to be a red 
head. One can, however, be lucky that red,headed individuals whom the institutor of the 
benefit at issue just happened to fix upon as the beneficiaries of her largesse. The point 
is that that in respect of which one can be lucky must involve the element of 
impredictability. And this is reflected in luck's volatility and inconsistency. A Scottish 
proverb, cited as early as 1721 ,  says "Behind bad luck comes good luck." (The reverse 6
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would be just as true!). And another old proverb iruists that .. The only sure thing about 
luck is chat it will change." 
The positive and negative things chat come one's way in the world's ordinary course­
inclu.ding one's heritage (biological, medical, social, economic), one's abilities and 
talents, the circumstances of one's place and time (be they peaceful or chaotic, for 
example)- all these are matters of whac might be characterized as fate and fonune. But 
the positivities and negativities that come one's way by chance and unforeseen 
happenstance-finding a treasure trove, for ex.ample, or walking away from an accident 
that injures others - are matten; ofluclc. You are heir to a fonune by auspicious face, but 
you are lucky to inherit it just in the nick of time to save you from bankruptcy. 
It is jU5t the element of surprise�( irnpredictability that distinguishes luck from fate 
or fortune at Large. Only if one takes too Literally the idea of a loc in life-by thinking of 
human biographies in terms of a lottery oflife,plan allocations to preexistingly identifiable 
individuaJs.--.c.an one conceptualize a person's over- all fate or destiny in tenns of luck. 
For only then would the sum - total of the goodls and evils befalling people become 
reduced--comprehensively and automatically-co a matter of chance allocation. 
Accordingly, a person can be fonunate to have a good disposition or a talent for 
mathematics, but she cannoc be luckJ in these regards because chance is not involved. 
Her disposition and talents is pan of what mak.es a person the individual she is; it is not 
something that chance happens to bring along and superadd to a preexisting identity. 
One can indeed be luclcy to encounter a person who induces or helps one to develop a 
talent. But having that talent itself is a matter of fonune rather than good luck. It makes 
no sense to assimilate personal fate to games of chance because with games there is always 
antecedently a player toencer into participation. while with people there is no antecedent, 
identity1bereft individual who draws the lot at issue with a particular endowment. 
The goods and bads that come a person's way reflect her fortunes--she is fortunate 
in those positivities and unfonunate in tho.5e negativities. But luck does not as yet enter 
in. For if those goods are realized through effort and those bads realized through mistakes, 
faults, and errors--that is to say if chance is not involved-then luck is not at issue. The 
person who permits herself to be duped out of her life savings by a confidence man is 
unfortunate but not, strictly spealcing, unlucky-as she would be if she lost it on a 
promising business venture. (f o be sure, if the con man picked her out of the crowd more 
or less at random, we would, on this basis, say that she was unlucky as well.) 
4. There's No Taking the Luck Out of Life 
From the very beginning of the species, much human effort has regularly been devoted 
to devising practices, systems, and institutions to make the future more tractable by 
reducing the scope of chance and iinpredicrability in our affairs. Our early shift from 
hunter 1 gatherer to farmer, from nomad to settler, was clearly des·igned to make it possible 
to meet our needs and achieve our ends with greater assurance. And, over the· millennia, 
an immense amount of human ingenuity and toil has been expended in this direction of 
reducing sheer luck's role in life. 
But there is obviously only so much we can do in this direction. The very idea of 
perfecting "control over nature" is something deeply problematic. The sensible view is 
clearly that of seeing this issue of control as a mixed bag. Admitting that an 1element of 
unforeseeability pervades all human affairs,11 Renaissance humanists often inclined to 
the optimistic view that rational endeavor can prevail against the slings and arrows of 
outrageous fortune. For example, the Italian scholar Poggio Bracciolini ( 1380-1459), in 7
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his tracts De miseria humanae condirioni.s and De wrieuue fortunae, championed the 
efficacy of rational vinue: "The strength of fortune is never so great that it will not be 
overcome by men who are steadfast and resolute. "12 As he saw h, prudent action can 
control the future's developments. Others took a much less sanguine line. Machiavelli, 
in Chapter 25 of 1l principe ( 1 5 13) after surveying the cruelties and haphazards of the 
politics of his day, set more restrictive limits to human endeavor by assigning half of what 
happens in this domain to the intractable power of fortuna, though her rogue force might 
be partially tamed by prudendy installed dikes and embankments. (On 20th.century 
indications, even this estimate looks rather too rosy.) 
To all appearances, then, it is the mixed.bag view of distinctly imperfect control that 
best accommodates the realities of the situation. For it is clear that various factoTS dictate 
that our power to shape the course of events is small-that our prospects of conttol are 
severely limited. One such factor is causal imporence. There is simply nothing that most 
of us can do, as individuals (unlike, say, the Secretary of Treasury or the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Bank), co influence the scock market to rise or fall: the issue is one thac 
lies beyond the reach of our powers. Another limiting faccor is inade.qwue infomuuion­
and predictive infonnacion in particular. (If I knew which scocks would rise comorrow, 
I would make money-buying some of them is within my power-but of course I lack any 
such knowledge.) For us humans, che future is veiled, as it were, in a cloud of unknowing. 
Through our predictive efforts we peer into ic as we peer into a fog. Very little can be seen 
at a d'i.stan�e-and that little with but little daricy. But as things draw near and the fog 
of unforseeability dissipates, we can-frequently-make out their features with greater 
detail. And so it is with the future. A future we cannot foresee is a farriori a future we 
cannot control. And historical experience and theoretical analysis alike indicate that 
both of these factors, both impotence and ignorance, severely limit our capacity to 
manipulate nature's course of events and to control the future consequences of our 
present endeavors. And here, of course, lies the root of luck. Given the limits of human 
knowledge and power, and given the prominence on the world's stage of the contingency 
engendering factors of chance, chaos, and choice to· say nothing of ignorance as such­
it transpires that luck is something that we simply have to accept as an inevitable fact of 
life. 
The profound importance of luck roots in the consideration of its constituting one of 
the salient characteristic features of the human condition. For, as emphasized throughout, 
luck is a fundamental and inevitable aspect of human finitude reflecting the fact of our 
vulnerability in the world over which we have imperfect cognitive and practical 
mastering. There simply is no way to take the luck out of a life whose future we can neither 
control nor foresee. 
5. A World Without Luck 
Is this fact ofluck's. role in human life an unmitigated misfortune? Would we even want 
the project of cognitive predictive control co be perfectible and thereby render the future 
"a sure ching"? How much would we actually want to know about the future-at any rate 
about that relatively near·tenn future that is most relevant for the lives of ourselves and 
those we know of and care about? Would we really want to have foreknowledge of the 
suffering that the yet unturned pages of time and circumstance hold in store for us and 
our children and their posterity-the catastrophes and misfortunes and suffe.ring thac 
await us all? These are challenging questions. And their resolution calls for some 
challenging acknowledgements. For in fact there are surely few punishments that could 8
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be inflicted upon a person rhat: would be as bad as to be confronted with the timetable 
of one's future-to be informed station by station, as it were, of all the major eventuations 
of one's life on earth. What misfortune will not be multiplied by anticipation, what 
triumph not diminished by foTeknowiedge of its certainty and its impermanence? 
It is the element of openness-of uncertaincy-chac gives our human present its savor 
and endows our envisioned future with a suspenseful interest. The factors of contingency 
and impredictability play a central and definitive pan here. There is a great experiential 
difference between the original game and the replay where the outcome is already "a 
foregone conclusion." Sheer contingent impredictability gives life's eventuations a 
special interest. Noc only in reading novels, plays, and mystery stories, buc also in living 
their everyday lives people generally welcome novelty and surprise whenever this does 
not involve something that is inherently unpleasant. In general the unsurprising is, for 
that very reason, uninteresting. (Noone finds "yescerday's news" all that intriguing.) We 
admire the technical skill of the tight-rope walk.er. But the ever-present chance that 
something may possibly go wrong adds a special thrill to the process. 
It is clear that our human psychological make-up has evolved in and become attuned 
to a world whose future is largely inaccessible to intelligence-a world whose plans for 
us lie concealed behind an impenetrable veil of iinpredictabilicy. This, for us, is part and 
parcel of the natural condition of things to which we have been attuned. And it has 
thereby become a positive thing too. For is it not one of the things that make our ever -
continuing transit into the future bearable that we do not know what it will bring? The 
veil of ignorance leaves room for hope, and the destruction of hope is the worst of evils. 
One can certainly imagine a creature in whose life luck has no role, a creature whose 
welfare and well .. being is only affected by effective cenainties, by totally predictable 
eventuations, that bears on its weal and woe being pre#ordained, pre-programmed, 
predictable. Such a being would lead a life without suspense and surprises, a life bereft 
of unexpected twists and turns where everything always runs "like clockwork,," according 
to predesignated plan-automatically. But this creature whose life is predictable in all its 
substantial details would certainly be something very different from ourselves. And we 
would surely not want co trade places with it. For we have been configured and 
compounded by natural selection to a world whose modus operandi is very different. And 
being what we have become, we would find it horrible to live in a luckless world. 
Our psychological and emotional condition is such that we would not want to live in 
a pre .. programmed world-a world where the rest of our fate and future is pre-0rdained 
and indeed pre-discernible in the realities of the present. The human yearning for 
novelty-for new experiences and prospects and possibilities is surely a characteristic 
aspect of what makes us into the sorts of creatures we are. A predictable world whose 
future is already fully pre-figured in the condition of the present, is something we 
naturally find repugnant. Even at the price of falling victim to chance and haphazard we 
yearn for novelty and innovation-for a liberation from an inevitability programmed by 
the past's dead hand. To eliminate luck we would have to lead less totally routinized lives. 
Like a colony of insects or a species of fish, we would seek out and eventually attune to 
virtually stable conditions. In consequence, we would have to stop being the sort of 
creature we are- a creature that lives by intelligence and thereby needs challenges, 
innovations, novelty. Escape from the ennui of established routines and predictable 
activities constitutes an important factor in our lives. The yearning for open horizons­
of new developments that make for suspense and surprises is inherent in our human 
nature. (Had we been content with static predictability we could have remained in the 
Garden of Eden.) Hamo sapiens is a creature of innovation endowed with an insatiable 
9
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need to explore, to try to encounter novelty. For us who see even a "predictable" novd 
or play in a decidedly negative light, an unfailingly "predictable" life would be painfully 
boring and altogether distasteful. 
Luck makes an 'important contribution to the savor and interest of human life. Its 
superposition of chance on skill gives a suspenseful excitement to our dealings which is 
important for us as the son of creatures we have become under evolution's shaping. A 
pastiche of foregone conclusions makes life dull, uninteresting, insupportable. No one 
waAts to watch a match between a top team and the neighborhood amateurs. Nobody 
wants to watch the same sporting event for fifty television replays. It is the unexpectedness 
and irnpredictability of a contest between two evenly matched teams that lends interest 
to a sporting event. To take the luck out of it is to destroy it.s intrerest. 
The risk of bad luck is the other side of the coin with which we pay for the prospect 
of good luck. And the whole two-sided complex of life in a world where luck holds sway 
and uncertainty plays a role is what we need to lead a life that we---constituted as we are 
{that is, as evolution in this world has made us}�n possibly find satisfactory. 
6. life in a Halfway House 
For a satisfying human life we need to exist in a halfway house with regard to 
predictability. We need (and apparently do actually have} a balance-a world that is 
predictable enough to make the conduct of life manageable, and-by and large­
convenient, but unpredictable enough to make room for an element of suspenseful 
interest. For we do also require the presence of much that is impredictable, novel, and 
surprising. A totally unpredictable world would be a horror even if (contrary to 
hypothesis) we were able to live in it. But the opposite extreme-a world that is 
substantially predictable, would equally be a horror. 
Predictability, then, is not a be-all and end-all. We humans need novelty and 
innovation---<:ontacc with the new, strange circumstances to nourish our minds and 
spirits. Without some exposure to chance and uncertainty we cannot function as the 
creatures we are - the sort of creatures we have become under the pressure of 
evolutionary development. We thrive in the interstices of chance that pervade a world 
of predominantly lawful order. We play games of chance, seek out stories and plays with 
unpredictable "suspense" endings, and pursue novelty change and breaks in routine 
precisely so to make life less predictable-less dull, routine, and boring. An enjoyable life, 
like a good story, must have a judicious mixture of uncertairlty {suspense) and predictability 
(security}. All the same, such escapes should themselves be circumscribed, limited and 
predictable if they are to prove benign. We need and seek novdty and change, but it 
remains something we want in predictable ways. (Which is why we opt for the 
predictability of genres such as "the detective story.") To live in ways that render our 
circumstances substantially foreseeable- ac least as regards fundamentals is an important 
feature of our human strategy for survival in a complex world. 
From the larger philosophical point of view, the crucial face is that the role ofluck irl 
human affairs illustrates the limitedness of human knowledge and highlights the 
cognitive situation of Homo sapiens as a being of limited capabilities. Our limitations in 
this regard reflect our expulsion from the Garden of Eden, with the consequence of 
putting us at the mercy of a reality over which we have only imperfect cognitive control­
only limited predictive foresight. Yet given the fact that we also have imperfect practical 
control, this cognitive irlcapacity is a blessing. For it would surely be horrendous to realize 
in advance the program of unwelcome things to, come whose irlexorable onset is 10
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aJrogerher beyond our power to help or to hinder. And, moreover, a predLcrable world 
is one without suspense, surprise, lucl, and aJl these deeper forms of novelty thac provide 
much of the "spice o( life." 
It is clearly of the essence of the condition of humaniry as we know it that we Live m 
a halfway house as regards predictability-a mixture of knowing and ignorance thac may 
change in its proportions with the condition of the times buc always hovers well between 
the extremes. For us, constituted as we are as we have become, if you will, under 
evolution's inexorable pressures--a world thac is too preponderantly predictable or coo 
preponderantly unpredictable would alike prove disastrous. 
Lucic therefore is, for good and ill, a faccor with which we have ro come co terms in 
chis world. And in the final analysis we would not wane co have it otherwise. A creature 
in whose life luck has no role would be something very different from ourselves, 
condemned to an existence which we would find abhorrenc. 
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IS "TRUE PHILOSOPHY" LIKE "TRUE ART'? 
Kai Nielsen 
"Philosophy," unlike "oak" or "robin," is not a name of a natural kind. It is now and has 
been for a very long time many different things, going on in a cultural context where 
standardly there is no clear sense of what their relationship is to each other. More than 
that, chey seem often at lease co be conflicting things. It is not very easy to see what (if 
anything) malces all these things philosophy. I shall display something of these differ­
ences, and in doing so show why UWhat is philosophy?" is itself a philosophical problem 
and indeed one which is deeply contested, perhaps incractibly contescable. 
Why should it be that "What is philosophy?" is itself a philosophical question and such 
a taxing one at that? Don'c philosophers know what they are doing? "What is chemiscry?" 
or "What is art hiscory ?" are not problems in chemistry or art history. We could say similar 
things for botany and engineering and a host of other subjects. Introductory textbooks 
on these subjects. as well as other similar subjects, as Thomas Kuhn has shown, 
oversimplify a bit and make things more straightforward than they actually are, but, that 
to the contrary notwithstanding, they usually give definitions or general characteriza· 
tions of their subject matter in the first few pages of their texts - characterizations that 
usually do not seem essentially wrong to other people in the field. But this is not so with 
philosophy for if the sampling of philosophers is at all wide, taking into consideration the 
history of the subject and diverse cultures, the very characterization of what their 
discipline or activity is will be keenly in dispute. Some philosophers will say that other 
philosophers are fundamentally mistaken in their very conception of what philosophy is 
and they will set out what they talce to be the correct conception which in tum will be 
similarly rejected by other philosophers. Jacques Maritain, Rudolph Carnap, J. L. Austin, 
Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida are all famous philosophers-infamous famous 
philosophers in some quarters-and they all do philosophy very differently. More 
generally, definitions and characterizations of philosophy differ radically. Some philoso­
phers find the characterizations offered by some other philosophers to be utterly 
wrongheaded or sometimes just plain gibberish. 
What are we to make of an activity in which there is such chronic dispute over what 
it is all about? Why should philosophy be such a tower of Babel? Perhaps philosophy is 
a cluster of conceptual confusions that should be dissolved, revealed by careful analysis 
to be che pseudo,problems philosophy gives voice to. All good contemporary philosophy 
books, such philosophers believe, should be anti-philosophy philosophy books. But then 
there is the question of the very status of the conceptual analysis that does that dissolving. 
ls that itself a bit of philosophy and, if that is so, and if its conceptual analysis iis soundly 
carried through, then it surely looks like not all philosophy can be conceptual confusion. 
Moreover, that aside, another at least initial response should be that throughout their 
history human beings have grappled with certain very fundamental categorial questions: 
good and evil, mind and body, freedom and necessity, God and immortality, and what 
is it for something to exist or for soine of those somethings to be persons? These questions 
are not the creations of philosophers but something that nearly everybody at one time 
or another, but typically when they are quite young, find it natural to reflect about and 
to see k to answer. It seems at least, the response goes, gratuitously dogmatic to push them 14
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aside as pseudo,problems. One wouJd have to have - or so it seems at least - very good 
grounds indeed for saying that all the problems of philosophy are pseudo-problems: 
symptoms of a conceptual malaise. Moreover, this very claim, namely, the claim thac all 
philosophical questions simply reveal the existence of a conceptual malaise. would itself 
have to be made out on philosophical grounds. So while it is reasonable to remain 
slc.eptical and suspicious about philosophy, it is not reasonable to dismiss it so easily as a 
putative discipline specializing in conceptual confusion. 
Gr.anting that "What is philosophy?" is itself a contentious philosophical question, 
why couJd it not have an uncontentious historical -sociologicaJ answer given by philo­
sophically infonned historians of ideas standing, though still with an understanding of the 
subject, outside of philosophy altogether! Such historians, as such specialists, would 
mow about philooophy in the sense of having a g<X>d mowledge of what phiJosophers 
have said, including the reasons they have given for saying what they say, and even of 
what they are saying now, but such historians still would, qua historians at least, be 
without philosophical views themselves. Why could such historians not take careful note 
of various activities that philosophers engage in and regard as philosophical, note what 
common and distinctive properties (if any) they have or what family resemblances they 
have (if any) and then, if there are such distinctive commonalities or resemblances, build 
a philosophicaJly neutral definition or characterization of philosophy on these common­
alities or resemblances? If no such features show up then the historian of ideas will report 
thac chere is not in fact the overlap necessary to yield a general characterization for the 
varied activities chat differenc people over h.iscorical time and culcural space have 
thought of as philosophical This is, after all, an empirical issue, and indeed (or so it 
seems) rather straightforwardly so, and surely it is not impossible that a philosophically 
trained, though philosophically viewless, historian of ideas, if she were diligent enough, 
could either come up with a philosophically neutral characterization or show why the 
activities called "philosophical" are so various that no such general characterization can 
be given, given the facts of the case. 
There are at least two problems with this. First, if we delete enough detail we may well 
get something that is common to everything philosophers do. We couldl note, for 
example, that philosophers "reflect and think" or "'ask questions" or "give arguments." 
Such things would, however, hardly be (a) both common to and distinctive of what 
philosophers do for activities that are not at all philosophical also involve those things 
and (b) what we find is so general as to be trivial. It gives us no good idea of what 
philosophy is about. It is highly unlikely that we will find anything that is significant and 
common to the various activities that get called philosophical. What is more likely is that 
such an historian could only responsibly note that philosophy is said to be X or Y or Z or 
V or Tor .... But these features (even the ones listed) would themsdves sometimes at least 
yield conflicting beliefs about what philosophy really is or should be. Some philosophers 
would go on saying about some of these conceptions that they were radically mistaken, 
hardly deserving to be called philosophy. Moreover, philosophers have often been well 
aware of certain characterizations of their discipline, and yet they have gone out of their 
way to say either that this is not what philosophy really is or that such characterizations 
actually obscure the "true goals" of philosophy. The great innovators in philosophy -
Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegd, Dewey, Husserl, and Wittgenstein 
- all thought the old philosophical foundations and conceptions were in shambles and 
sought to conceive of philosophy in a radically new way. It is these, and other, distinctive 
conceptions that count in trying to conceive what philosophy is. 
The historian of ideas can draw co out attention, when we get too ethnocentric or parti 
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pris, that philosophy has not always been just what we say it is and that there are other 
conceptions of philosophy about in the world. But the struggle is over which activities 
are genuine philosophical activities worthy of pursuit and which are not. But here the 
historian of ideas. qua historian of ideas, can supply linle guidance. He can only enrich 
our historical perspective. Only philosophers, if anyone, can substantively help us here. 
They alone, if anyone, can tell us what genuine philosophy is. That is a philosophical issue 
and must be argued out and thought out on philosophical grounds. That is why, as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell have stressed, there can be no mecaphilosophy if by 
"metaphilosophy" is meant a view prior w arry philosophy which can tell us what 
philosophy is and to be reasonable must be. There is no nonphilosophical vantage point 
that can decide that. Philosophy cannot help but be a bootstrapping operation. The 
skeptical philosophical worry is that "genuine philosophy'' might tum out to be like "true 
art," "real champions," "genuine religion," or "real native cuisine." 
Let me illustrate. I know pe·rfectly well that Rudolf Carnap regards philosophy as the 
logic of the sciences and Martin Heidegger regards it as "the correspondence to the Being 
of being"; but I regard both such conceptions as radically inadequate. Carnap's is wildly 
one-sided catching at best what some philosophers do and Heidegger's approximates 
gibberish. (Ibis is not to give to understand that everything Heidegger says is so 
approximate.) Moreover, neither in their characterizations get at what l take to be the 
heart of the matter - what is really important in philosophy. But, though ] perfectly 
unequivocally feel that way, the historicist in me prQmp� me to �k. Perhaps some of this 
onesidedness, after all, gives us the only sort of thing that philosophy can really do if it 
is to aspire to give us genuine knowledge or insight. Perhaps philosophy of science is 
philosophy enough. Moreover, can l be so sure that what l regardl as gibberish really is so? 
Heidegger has many admirers; and philosophers from my own tradition whom I very 
much admire (Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor and Stanley Cavell) take Heidegger to be 
a philosopher of very considerable importance. I should, given such considerations, be 
a little skeptical about my beliefs about what is really fundamental or about what is really 
gibberish. 
Perhaps my own reactions simply give voice to one culturally and historically 
circumscribed conception of what philosophy is. But how, one is tempted to respond, 
could it be anything else? But if it couldn't be anything else or more, then why accept it? 
The other side of the coin is "How could anyone dlo anything else? How could they not 
but see things by their own lights? What other lights could they see them by?" Still, we 
can listen to others, sometimes very different others, tum over and take to heart what 
they say, and sometimes, in doing this, we can correct our own views or at least change 
our minds or (more realistically) partly change our minds. It remains, however, after all 
that, that there is no alternative but to see things by our own lights and we further know 
that we, like everyone, are creatures of a certain culture of a certain time in history with 
all the contingencies that brings. And we know that there is no escaping that. We cannot, 
as Hegel stressed , leap over history. 
This contextualism (if that is the right name for it) is not unique to philosophy. But 
should be seen as a cautionary tale to any philosopher or philosophy that has sufficient 
hubris and unselfconsciousness to think it could speak for all time and eternity. Speaking 
for all time and eternity is not likely to be a hang,up of a chemist or economist. It is 
philosophers spooked by what they take to be the spectre of relativism who try to escape 
into Absolutism. 
16
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Even with this furn sense of the cono.ngency of things (the cultural and hisconcal 
variability of things) lC is not unreasonable co seek some order here. A phllosopher m 
asking whar philosophy is is tn reahry ryp1cally aslung what, of che cower of Babel that has 
been philosophy, would be good philosophy, the domg of somethtng chac would give 
philosophy a genuine potnr. Some inioal ordering TTUghc come from chese characcenza. 
UOn5: 
1. Philosophy 11S an analyncal study of concepts. 
2. Philosophy is an analytical study of the pivotal concepts that in che 
most general way organize our thought or action. 
These are conceptions thac some analytical philosophers would defend. They are also 
certamly conceptions which are nor without their problems. First it is anything but dear 
that this should be the whole of good philosophy. But, that aside for the time being, it is 
not clear what a concept is and if, to clarify things, we say a concept is simply che use of 
a word we land ourselves tn various ways on contested ground. Suppose we .say that to 
speak of the concept of mind, cruth or justice is to speak of the use of "mind," "true" or 
"just." We speak of concepts not in order to cry co fly into a Platonic heaven (something 
even the early G. E. Moore did) but to make it evident we are not only talking about the 
use of English terms but, as well, about the equivalent terms in other languages.1 Bue if 
this is what the analytical srudy of concepts comes co why is it not an empirical study of 
the way language works and so a task for linguists or at least a task to be shared between 
linguists and philosophers? Still, is it nor clear that here we have with such a conception 
a taslk for philosophy? But it is clear that if we so construe philosophy it would no longer 
be the autonomous discipline or activity that philosophers have prized. 
Relatedly it is not clear what an analytical study of concepts comes co. Is it a 
description of the concepts, an interpretation of their import, an explanation of them and 
if so in what sense of "explanation" or is it a logical analysis of these concepts, but, if so, 
in what sense of"logic"? Logic seems to be essentially a matter of proving theorems and 
making various kinds of derivations but that does not seem at lease to be what 'is involved 
in the conceptual anslysis of concepts. 2 How is clarifying the concept of mind, truth or 
justice anything l:ilce a matter of proving theorems or making derivations? If we call it 
logical analysis what does "logical" mean here? It does not seem (pace Carnap and Hans 
Reichenbach) that anything like derivation or demonstration is at issue here. Bue then 
what is? What does an analytical study of concepts come to and how is it - or is it - the 
unique province of philosophy?3 
Even if such issues can be reasonably resolved we need to ask questions about the 
second aniculation of what philosophy is. If philosophy is not the study of just any 
concepts you like or the concept of science (as some logical empiricists believed) but of 
pivotal concepts that in the most general way organize our thought and action, then it 
is incumbent on the philosopher so conceiving of philosophy co say what they are and to 
elucidate a bit what he means by "pivotal" and "organizing" here. Presumably truth, 
existence, human being, knowledge, rationality, reasonability, belief, evidence, good, 
ness, justice, beauty, freedom, God and immortality are such concepts, though plenty of 
contemporary philosophers would not so regard the last two. Indeed some of them think 
of these last two as pseudo�concepts co be excised from rational discourse. Bue historically 
for many philosophers they have been thought to be pivotal organizing concepts. A good 
philosophy would have to have some way of deciding such an issue or at lease showing 
that some ways of looking at things were more plausible or reasonable than ochers. But 17
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in getting tolerably clear about such a conception of philosophy we need to get an idea 
of what we are talking about when we say that these are pivotal concepts chat organue 
our thoughc or action. And why action as well as rhoughc? ls a proper phil�hy co cell 
us (in some general way) what co do or what right or just action is? ls chat a role for che 
analytical study of anything? And why che qualification "general" in that characteriza· 
tion of philosophy? How general and in what way? Perhaps such general characteriza. 
rions will yield only platitudes? 
There is a differenc bur perhaps complimentary conception of philosophy that has 
often been articulated. It G. Collingwood was an important defender of such a view. le 
can be stated as follows: 
3. Philosophy articulates and makes perspicuous the underlying pre· 
suppositions of science, morality, politics, art, religion - in short our 
various cenrral forms oflife - and seeks co give a coherent account or 
at lease a coherent picture of how they fi.t together. 
I chink it is clear enough that J is compatible with 1 and 2. Indeed it is probably the case 
that a coherent account or even a reasonable picture of how these forms of life hang 
together could not be had without some clarification of the concepts involved. So 
difficulties that attach to 1 will be passed on to 3. But 3, as interesting as it is, has problems 
of its own. What is a "presupposition " and what is "an underlying•• one? Perhaps 
"underlying presupposition" is pleonastic? That last point aside, how do we detect them 
in science, morality, politics and the like and in our life.world more generally? (Hans 
Reichenbach, for example, argued that what Kant took to be a presupposition of science, 
namely, the principle of causality, wasn,t one.)4 Is some principle of induction a 
presupposition for science, is some conception of rationality one for morals and is some 
conception of the ubiquity of power one for politics? But then how is induction, 
rationality and power to be conceived? And how is philosophy to articulate them? 
Presumably philosophy seeks co isolate these presuppositions,, dig them out so to speak 
from the flow of talk and conceptualization in these various forms oflife and the workings 
of the social practices that are part of these forms of life. In making the presuppositions 
perspicuous, it presumably states them clearly and further clarifies them where necessary. 
(But when is it necessary? Do we have any conception of "complete clarity" or even of 
.. sufficient clarity'" here?)5 It will also display their relations. But again we can ask is what 
is to be displayed their logical relations, causal relations, or some other kinds of relations? 
And if some other kind what other kinds? Moreover, is it reasonable to expect them to 
fit together? And, if so, how is this fit to be conceived? We also need some characteriza, 
tion of what a form of life is and of what science, morality, politics, art and religion are 
and some demarcation of them as well. What are che respective spheres of religion and 
science or religion and morality or morality and politics and how is this to be determined? 
It is not only with "underlying" that we have something problematic, but with 
"central,, as well in "central forms of l ife." There are many forms oflife. Some at certain 
times and places have greater or lesser importance. Some, even though they are 
ubiquitous, are certainly not central. Morality is ubiquitous and central. Exorcism is not 
ubiquitous across cultures and times, but during some times and at some places it has been 
both central and ubiquitous. Many,sidedness is ubiquitous but not central. Still how we 
are to determine what is central and what is not is not by any means crystal clear. Perhaps 
it would be pervasively contested at least across times and cultures? 
Finally, what is it to give an account of how these forms of life hang together? What 
kind of an account are we to give of their hanging together? An empirical descriptive 18
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account, an interpretive account, a causal account, some bnd of critical normative 
account or some combination of them and if so in what combination? Should it be some 
kind of metaphysical or categorial account which is distinct from any of the aoove and, 
if so. what is meant by .. metaphysical" or .. categorial" here? If such an account can be 
nothing more than a picture. how is the metaphor .. picrure" to be understood? And we 
should recall rhat th.ere were philosophers in the heyday oflogical empiricism who spoke 
of verbal magic here: who rejected picture thinking with its analogism.6 
The questions I have directed toward 3, as well as l and 2, are questions typical enough 
of philosophical activity particularly on rhe analytical side. So by illustration you can get 
a glimpse of what some characteristic philosophical activity look.s like. I do not mean to 
give ro understand by posing all these questions that I think these conceptions of 
philosophy are worthless or even unfruitful. I think all three have a point and indeed an 
important point. It is also easier in philosophy, as elsewhere, to ask questions than to give 
answers. The Socrateses always have an easier time of it than the Aristotles. It is also 
difficult to ascertain or even guess when we have fecklessly asked a question, aslced a 
question once too often, as sometimes children do and as something clever sillies cum 
into a vocation. le is also difficult over such matters, as it typically is in philosophy, co 
detennine where the burden of prooflies. Once this has been firmly established the battle 
is often at least half won. Sometimes it may even be .all over. Which ones (if any) of these 
questions would need to be answered could only be ascertained by a detailed examination 
of these conceptions. 
For certain purposes we might ignore them for all three conceptualizations. For any 
given inquiry certain questions need to be begged; certain things need to stand fast. 7 
Sometimes there is a point in taking a certain conception of philosophy and seeing how 
far we can run with it. This seems to me true of 1 ,  2 and 3. But in our present contexc in 
crying to give a sense of how contested and contestable the very concept of philosophy 
is it is important to see something of the range of questions that can readily. and noc 
altogether artificially. be raised about these different conceptions. We. if we reflect on 
them, will come to see how reasonable persons might come to reject any or all of these 
conceptions. 
There is a fourth conception of what philosophy is or at least should be that rests on 
the prior acceptance of something l�e 3 as a legitimate cask of philosophy, but conceives 
of what it takes to be a still more fundamental or important task for philosophy. a task 
which gives expression to a distinct conceptualization of the subject. 
4. Philosophy is a critique (a cluster of interrelated criticisms) of the 
underlying presuppositions of the various forms of life, practices. 
institutions and ideologies of humankind. 
Here. too. a whole battery of questions emerge about such a conception. How does 
philosophy gain a foothold here? For "philosophy" in 4 we could have substituted. 
perhaps without loss of content, "social criticism," "theology," "critical social science," 
"cultural critique" and perhaps other things as well. (That most of us now would not put 
theology in that role says something about what Max Weber characterized as the 
relentless disenchantment of the world.) Not a few philosophers, Wittgenstein, John 
Wisdom and Richard Rorty. but as well many linguistic philosophers with no philosophi, 
c.ally therapeutic intentions, would challenge that philosophy had any or could reason, 
ably come to have any such critical function. What kind of knowledge or understanding 
- knowing things that no one ellse can know so well - would philosophy have to have to 19
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enable it to play the role of culture cricic? What criterion does it have that enables il co 
show that whole domains of science are in error, that morality itself (noc jusc some 
philosopher's or ideologisc1s conception of morality) rests on a mistake, thac religion is 
irrational, thac an is devoid of insighc or that philosophy is something that yields us a kind 
of insight not possessed by the ordinary person? It assumes (or at least seems to assume) 
thac philosophers have some discipline called epistemology that tells them in general 
terms what knowledge really is or what justified beliefs really are so that philosophy could, 
using this discipline, find out if there really is any knowledge or justified beliefs in any 
science or in morality or in any area of everyday life. It would tell us how to fi.x belief in 
any domain whats0ever. But, as the critique of foundationalism and other general 
conceptions of normative epistemology has forced on our anenrion, it is very question· 
able indeed whether we have any clear conception or even a fruitfully suggestive 
conception of how we might come to have such a general crit,erion for knowledge or 
justified belief. It is not clear that philosophers, or anyone else for that matcer, could say 
anything non·trivial about what knowledge - any kind of knowledge at all in any domain 
- consists in or whether there are such general criteria at all.8 Perhaps we can, perhaps 
there is such philosophical knowledge or such a general Archimedean point, but in our 
very conceptualization of what philosophy is we cannot reasonably scan by just assuming 
it. We, in some other sense of"philosophy,,, would have to argue for it and once we had, 
if we ever would have, such a sound argument then we could make a claim for its being 
a pan of but not the whole of what philosophy is. 
Could we substitute "logic" for epistemology as providing the substance of the 
rationale for such critique? I think not. Logic could show us whether certain sentences 
or propositions were consistent with each other and it could help us see the logical 
implications of our beliefs or at least those that had been or at least could be codified by 
logic. This can in some circumstances be helpful. Reasonable people do not want to have 
genuinely inconsistent beliefs and in gaining a perspicuous representation of our beliefs 
it is useful to have clearly displayed at least some of the implications of our beliefs and 
their logical relations. But a set of beliefs or even a whole belief·system (say, Christian 
Science) might be consistent and perspicuously displayed and still be utterly absurd or 
mythological. Logic can help in critiquing our presuppositions by showing us what follows 
from what and what can consistently go together but it can hardly provide the core of our 
critique. But we seem with such a conception of philosophy to be without any clear 
understanding of what critique would or could come to here. 
There is a related conception of philosophy advocated by some pragmatists among 
others that has related difficulties but if they can be overcome it could afford us 
something quite useful. 
5. Philosophy is the criticism of criticisms. 
Here philosophy goes uberhaupc from literary criticism, cultural critique, social 
critique, critical social science, science, theology and any of the more determinate fonns 
of critique. It gives us, in the form of a critical theory of inquiry, general criteria of criticism 
for assessing the soundness or at least the plausibility of our various fonns and types of 
criticism and of our different styles of reasoning. I t  could show us, for example, that our 
specific canons of criticism, say, in literary criticism or social criticism, were mistaken. 
Dewey, in a wide· sense of"logic", called this theory of inquiry logic. It can (and does) use 
the consistency criteria and implicative criteria of formal logic (logic period as we 
characterized it above). But, as we have seen, that is not enough to yield a philosophical 
20
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criticlSTTl that would give us a basis for a .. criticism of criticisms." Dewey made non,formal 
claims about method-scientific method -where "science" is broadly conceived. But th.is 
loob at lease as if it would be afflicted by difficulties similar co those of epistemology 
discussed above. 
Richard Rorty, a neo,pragmatist generally sympathetic co Dewey, argues againsc 
Dewey (and Sidney Hook as well) that such a conception of inquiry vacillates between 
truisms which would not give us anything sufficiently substantive to so critique fonns of 
life and something more substantive which is also problemackal.9 The truisms are just 
that, but Dewey in see Icing something of more substance for his theory of inquiry falls into 
some of the mistakes of the epistemological tradition. Again, we have a conception of 
philosophy which is interesting, but would for its defence require extensive philosophical 
argument in some other sense of "philosophy" than that of "a criticism of criticisms." 
III 
The above five conceptions of philosophy all more or less securely belong co what has 
been called critical philosophy: philosophy whose central aim is not to construct 
speculative systems of thought ,designed to reveal or articulate "ultimate reality" or "the 
ultimate nature of reality" in its interconnections, !but to critically analyze the concepts 
and beliefs that we have or the beliefs and concepts, or conceptualizations that some 
philosopher, scientist or other intellectual might concoct. But there are other more 
speculative, more metaphysically oriented conceptions of philosophy - let us call them 
speculative philosophies - which conceptualize philosophy differently than any of the 
ways conceptualized above. They are no longer, at lease in an Anglo,American­
Scandinavian environment, the dominant conceptions of philosophy, but historically 
they have been very important and they have some able defenders today. Two, 
themselves rather different conceptions, will serve as examples. Jacques Maritain, a 
distinguished Catholic philosopher, defines philosophy as follows: 
6. Philosophy is the science which by the light of reason studies the first 
causes or highest principles of all things - is, in other words, the 
science of things in their first causes, in so far as these belong to the 
natural order .... 10 
It is evident at a glance how distant this conception is from the conceptions of critical 
philosophy. But, even more than critical philosophy, it is very problematical indeed. For 
starters to think of philosophy as a science is, at best, perplexing. It is certainly not an 
experimental science like physics or biology and it is not a formal science either like 
mathematics or logic. But that seems at least to exhaust all the sciences there are. Perhaps 
in using "science'' Maritain means no more than whalt in German is meant by "Wissenschaft" 
where what is being referred to by Wissenschaft is any systematic study. On that 
conception, theology is a science but so is astrology or perhaps even Christian Science 
and that seems at least to be a reductio of so speaking of science. At least, if this is 
Maritain's construal, calling philosophy a science is not very useful. Presumably he 
intends something more vigorous, but it is not evident what that something is. And to 
speak, as Maritain does, of what "by the l ight of reason" philosophy studies is to use a 
metaphor which very much needs unpacking. What is it to speak of "reason" here? Is to 
study something "by the light of reason" simply "to think carefully, systematically and 
thoroughly" about it? But if that is so why doesn't Maritain simply say so? Speaking of"by 21
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the light of reason." given the tradition of the Ancients and Classical rationalism, 
certainly suggests something more.11 But what is this more? It suggests some kind of 
"rational insight" going beyond argument and the marshalling of evidenceY But what is 
that? Is there such a thing? How does it differ - or does it - from feeling strongly about 
something or having a sense of cenainry? At the very least such a conception needs 
careful elucidation. It appears at least only to obfuscate things. le does not help us gain 
a clear conception of what philosophy should be. 
Right after his talk of "by the light of reason, .. Maritain speaks of philosophy as 
studying .. the first causes or highest principles of all things", but this, as a way of 
characterizing philosophy, is even more question begging than some of the other 
conceptions we have discussed. Perhaps there are first causes or, what is something else 
again, highest principles and perhaps, what is still something else again, "the highest 
principles of all things", but lots of good philosophers have not thought that. A few have 
even thought that such conceptions are incoherent.13 It is a bad mistake to so define 
philosophy such that thinkers with such beliefs could not even be doing philosophy. 
Rather "philosophy" should be so defined as to accommodate both kinds of thmkers and 
then within philosophy itself arguments should be developed as to whether or not we could 
prove or in some way establish (either conclusively or probabilistically) that there are or 
are not such first causes or highest principles of all things or whether either or both of 
these conceptions are incoherent. We should not !beg such issues in our very definition 
of what philosophy is. 
A similar thing is true of Maritain's .. the science of things in their first causes, in so far 
as these belong to the natural order." This repeats the other assumptions and introduces 
the conception of "the natural order." Bue this just assumes what many philosophers and 
others as well would deny, that there is something to contrast with .. the natural order," 
e.g., "the supernatural order," "the spiritual order/' "the non-natural order," .. the moral 
order." Perhaps some such contrast can be coherently and even justifiably be made. Bue 
it is not evident chat it can. There are philosophers who think "the natural order" is 
pleonastic and others who think that, whether it is pleonascic or not, that is all there is. 
Again we do not want to preclude such lines of thought in our very definition of 
philosophy. 
The second example that I :shall give of the speculative tradition defining philosophy 
comes from Maurice Cornforth, a well-known English Marxist of a preanalytical Marxist 
vintage. Cornforth tells us chat 
7. Philosophy is the attempt co understand the nature of the world and 
our place and destiny in it. 14 
With this conception there is the problem, inherent in some of the other conceptions 
as well, of distinguishing philosophy from theology, religion, myth or science. We could 
substitute any of those things for "philosophy" in Comforth's definition. The various 
sciences attempt co understand the nature of the world as do religion and theology, at 
least on some conceptualizations. Some of the sciences try co sho·w our place in the world 
and a few scientists, more frequently as they approach retirement, might think that some 
bits of science attempt to understand our destiny (assuming we have such a thing) . 
Certainly religion, myth and theology all try to aid us in understanding our destiny. So 
to characterize philosophy as Cornforth does, does not distinguish it clearly from these 
other disciplines or activities. 
Such a conceptualization does not at all help co demarcate philosophy. To say, 22
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 24 [1993], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol24/iss1/1
1 16 Kai Niel.sen 
moreover, that only philosophy really helps us co understand the nature of thing lS a 
rather incredible claim to make in the face of the development of physics and b1ology. 
Funhermore, again such a claim needs co be argued m philosophy and not co be made as 
part of its very definition. Some philosophers chink that if anything explains such things 
it is science. Others, slceprical aoouc any claims of anyone to explain something so general 
as the nacure of the world, let alone our place and destiny in it, will be chrough and 
through convinced that ic is noc the task of philosophy or indeed any ocher discipline co 
give such explanations. Some will believe that anempced explanations here can be 
noching other than pseudcrexplanations.1s Again such things as Comfonh claims here 
should be argued for inside philosophy and not made a pare of its very defmmon. 
IV 
Perhaps ocher definitions of philosophy which capcure better che cradicion of speculative 
philosophy can be given. Still the above two concepcions are representative of the once 
dominanc tradition. To gee a fair perspective here it should be added that defenders of 
such a tradition can and sometimes do accept a good bit of critical philosophy.16 They 
could believe, for example, that philosophy should involve the analytical study of 
concepts, indeed that that was even a necessary first step in philosophy, but they still cake 
chat study to be ancillary to speculative philosophy. The central thing, these speculative 
philosophers believe, is that we should seek to attain an understanding of the ultimate 
principles irt terms of which everything, irtcluding the nature and destiny of human 
beings, can be explained. To satisfy our craving for explanation, we need, speculative 
philosophers believe, to have explanations which will give us an ultimate accountirtg of 
things. Being the sort of creatures we are our hearts and minds will not, the claim goes, 
rest easy until we have such ultimate explanations of ultimate reality. That is the 
fundamental metaphysical urge that cannot be theorized away. We are, among other 
things, metaphysical animals. We will push, cypically, perhaps always inarticulately, 
towards ultimate explanations and ultimate principles which show us whac ultimate 
reality is like.17 
In doing this we should start by characterizing our presupposed concepts and beliefs 
accurately and dearly in a manner that shows their connections. We should chen seek 
co ascenain which of these presupposed beliefs and presuppositions are true and, as well, 
determine which of the true beliefs or presuppositions are the more fundamental and, 
with respect to the more fundamental ones, define the concepts embedded in them and, 
using these defined concepts, tty, using beliefs expressive of them, to derive other true 
beliefs from che more fundamental ones. Some of our concepts may be so fundamental, 
say, goodness or truth, that we will have to take them as primitive. But, whether this is 
so or not, we should seek to articulate our mo.st fundamental concepts and the ultimate 
presuppositions containing them and to see how they hang together. This may give us a 
picture of ultimate reality: the point where a quest for explanation must come to an end 
where we have something that on reflection we recognize co be self evident. 18 
This conception of the classical tradition of metaphysical or .speculative philosophy 
is a tall order. Not many people any more think that anything like this can be achieved 
or that we should even try to achieve it. We could not, of course, prove an ultimate 
principle for if we could prove it it would not be ultimate, nor can we give grounds for 
ultimate explanations for again if we could give grounds for them they would not be 
ultimate explanations. But somehow we should just be able co see - to intuit- that cenain 
explanations are ultimate and certain principles are true ultimate principles. We will just, 23
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the claim goes, intuitively apprehend them to be true - self-evidently true - if we will be 
genuinely and carefully reflective. 19 
The problems here are myriad. Perhaps there are very general propositions which are 
self-evidently true such as "Red things are colored"; "Puppies are young dogs"; "All 
objects have extension"; "Every event has a cause" (as distinct from "Every effect has a 
cause"). All or some of these may be self-evident and true. but, even if they are, they are 
not very substantive and it is also not so evident why we should regard them as ultimate 
or fundamental and try to base our understanding of reality on them. Some, as in my first 
two examples, are true because they are true by definition. We just mean, in the 
appropriate context and when not talking about seals, by "puppy" a "young dog" and 
something that is red is just something that we will also say is colored. We have no 
understanding of whar it would be like for something to be red but not colored. This just 
reflects our conceptual practices. (I say "conceptual practices" rather than "linguistic 
practices" for the same thing holds for equivalent sentences in other languages.) 
The other two examples are more problematic. "Every effect has a cause," like the first 
two, is true by definition. All three sentences are sentences which, in the pre-Quinean 
analytic tradition, would have been called analytic, i.e., true in virtue of their meanings 
or use alone. But "Every event has a cause" is not equivalent co "Every effect has a cause., 
and most people would be hesitant to claim that determinism is true by definition or by 
stipulation and some would not think that determinism is true at all. It is, moreover, not 
at all clear what would count towards establishing the truth or falsity of "Every event has 
a cause." Some say the phenomena of quantum mechanics refutes it. But others give 
quantum mechanics a reading that is compatible with determinism. What is clear enough 
is that "Every event has a cause," while being a bit more substantive than "Every effect 
has a cause," is not self-evident. Indeed it might not be true at all. Similar things are even 
more evidently true of" All objects have extension." Some think it is plainly false because 
of mathematical objects and other universals or, alternatively, because of intentional 
objects. Others would refuse to give numbers or redness or humanity or the State such 
a Platonistic reading. Indeed some th.ink such talk incoherent. But some will think of 
"intentional objects" and they will not think of them as having extension, though they 
will not Platonize them either. In any event "objects have extension" is hardly true by 
definition or a self-evident truth. 
More generally where, on the one hand, we get anything among these general truisms 
(or perhaps in some instances falsisms} with some substantive bite they are not self­
evident and how we would establish their truth or falsity is (to put it minimally) unclear. 
Where, on the other, we get20 something that has the smack of self-evidence we get 
something with little content. 
The above aside, talk of "ultimate reality," "ultimate explanations" and "'ultimate 
principles" is obscure. Do we have in mind the fundamental particles of physics when we 
speak of ultimate reality? If we do then that is plainly something for physics (an empirical 
science) to ascenain and claim, if any discipline does, and not for philosophers to 
pontificate on, let alone for it to be something that is taken to be a part of the very 
province of philosophy. But ic is not only that but as well chat there is an historical 
element involved here that would surely not be welcome co the metaphysician. What 
physicists took to be the fundamental particles 200 years ago is not what they take to be 
the fundamental particles now and it is a safe bet that what they will take to be the 
fundamental particles 200 years from now will be still different. There is no way of just 
determining, from some perspective outside of history, from some view from nowhere, 
from some Absolute perspective, what the fundamental panicles must be. Some 24
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 24 [1993], No. 1, Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol24/iss1/1
1 18 Kai Nielsen 
metaphysicians wishapnon codetermine dus. Bue that 15 nor something they can do. This 
is, ulrima.ielJ, whatever its genesis, an experimencal lSSue and there ts no second,guessing 
physics. The philosopher cannoc even say whac me fundamental parncles are let alone 
what they must be. There 15, moreover, no gaming something which 15 self,evidenc here. 
It is, however, doubcful that most metaphysici.aru have sometlung like this m mind 
when rhey calk about ultimate reality. Some--physicalists or materialists-will say c:hac 
everything is physical, leaving the concrete specificanon of what is physical to the 
scientist; mencal matters (sensations, believings, thoughts) are physical processes or 
occurrences (perhaps brain states, perhaps gro.sser functions of the body as well) and 
numbers (so called mathematical objects) are human constructs. Metaphysicians our of 
the Canesian cradirion will say thac besides physiatl mings and processes chere are, as a 
distinct kind of reality, men cal things or processes and that neither can be reduced to the 
other. Other metaphysiciaru - they may or may not be dualists - will say that in addition 
to material things there are spiritual principles revealing a supernatural reality which is 
the ultimate realiry and is r.he explanation and ultimate cause of all the other realities. 
These metaphysical stances can and somecimes do receive a far more sophisticated 
articulation than what is gestured at here, but the point in this context is that in any of 
their formulations they are far from self,evident. le is not clear how any of them could be 
established or that !they are even coherent. But even granted, as many now think about 
physicalism, that it can be coherently stated. it is far from clear what would establish it 
to be true or the most probably correct account we have of ultimate reality: the way things 
are and muse be. Perhaps among sophisticated philosophers physicalism is the only 
metaphysical game in town if indeed there are any plausible metaphysical games iri or out 
of town. Bue that judgment may say more about the concemporary Weltgeist than about 
anything that could be soundly argued� Bue that any such metaphysical claim at all -
dualist, physicalist, supematuraJisc - could be established is even a more fundamental 
problem. The attack on metaphysics has been going on for the last 200 years; it is not just 
a phenomena of logical empiricism and goes with, though it may not be dependent on, 
the rise of science as a fundamental source of explanation of the way the world is, 
including the human world. The metaphysician's a priori constructions carry little 
conviction in our Weltgeist. If we have metaphysics at all it is very likely to be metaphysics 
within the limits of science alone.20 
Some will say that such an attitude is a scientistic attitude reflecting the dominant 
ideology of our time, namely, the groundless and indeed a partisan belief that what 
science (most particularly the hard natural sciences) cannot tell us humankind cannot 
lcnow. It is this ideology, not clear thinking, not a clearly articulated critical philosophy, 
not the development of science or logic, that sustains, some believe, the anti,metaphysi, 
cal attitude of our time. This itself is a reasonably widely held view, but people who would 
pounce on it as a rationale for sticking with speculative philosophy should at least take 
pause that such leading critics of scientism as Hilary Putnam, Richard Rotty, Stanley 
CaveU, and Jurgen Habennas are also rejectors of metaphysics. 2 1  
v 
I want in bringing this essay to a close co give something of a rationale (a very panial 
rationale) for why "What is philosophy?" has itself been so variously construed and to 
make a suggestion about how we might possibly and plausibly set about giving some order 
to that chaos. 
"Philosophy.'' as we have noted, like "science," "religion," "morality," "explanation/' 25
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"knowledge," and "belief and unlike "rock," "tree," "human being," "bear," and "fly," is 
not a name of a natural kind. It has no essence or underlying structure that it must meet 
or be co be philosophy. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions for something 
being philosophical any more than there are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something being scientific. What is science is what scientists do when rhey do what they 
regard as science. What is philosophical is what philosophers do when they are doing 
things they themselves regard as philosophical. So in saying what is philosophy or what 
is science, it would seem, at first blush at least, that we should go completely descriptivist: 
what is philosophical is what philosophers do. They, of course, do many different things 
so philosophy is a many varied splendor just as is science. 
However, ic should also be noted that "philosophy" and "'science" are also used 
eulogiscically.21 There are disputes among people who regard themselves as scientists 
about what disciplines are really scientific. Some physicists and logician-mathematicians 
(to say nothing of traditionalist analytic philosophers) wish to rule psychology, sociology, 
and anthropology from the scientific domain or to rule out at least large parts of those 
disciplines (pseudo-disciplines) . Moreover, there is disagreement among scientists about 
which putative scientists are really scientists. Some will deny that accolade to Freud, 
Skinner, Marx, Pareto, and Piaget. Philosophers have similar difficulties with what is 
philosophy. Some logicians do not regard moral and political philosophy as really 
philosophy and some moral and political philosophers return the compliment. Whether 
Montaigne, Pascal, Vico, Herder, Kierkegaard, Newman, Nieczsche, or even (in some 
quarters) Hegel are really philosophers is a matter of dispute, though not whether Plato, 
Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Kant are. The latter group, it is pervasively 
believed, are securely a part of the canon. But we have to be careful even here. For a long 
time Hegel would have been securely a part of the canon and in some quarters Marx 
would be too. But some now would deny that canonical status to Hegel.23 And some, 
including some who think very highly of Marx indeed, would deny that he was a 
philosopher or say that philosophy was only a marginal concern of his: a concern 
principally of his youth. Nietzsche is perhaps the most instructive example. For Conti· 
nental philosophers as different as Heidegger, Habermas, Gadamer, Foucault, and 
Derrida, Nietzsche is securely a part of the canon as he is for such Anglo-American 
mavericks as Danto, Taylor, Macintyre, Rorty, and Nehmas. Indeed some think of him 
as a very central figure in the Western tradition. But even such astute and non-parti pris 
Anglo-American philosophers as Isaiah Berlin, Iris Murdoch, Stuart Hampshire, and 
Anthony Quinton in their 1955 discussion, "Philosophy and Belief," all agreed that 
Nietzsche plainly was not a philosopher at all but, as important as he was, was a sage going 
Welumschauungish. 24 
So, as with scientists on science, so with philosophers on philosophy, if we try to go 
purely descriptive, we will see that this is hardly possible for there is disagreement about 
who are the philosophers and who are not. The canon shifts. lfit is replied that the canon 
shifts but not completely so, then it should in turn be replied that if we take only the most 
ubiquitously certain members we would constrain our conception of philosophy far more 
than most people who get paid for teaching something that is called "philosophy" in the 
university curriculum would desire or be willing to accept. It is a hot matter of dispute 
whether Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Emerson, Newman, or Marx are really philosophers. 
And it is equally a matter of dispute, though the dispute is less torrid {fewer people care) , 
whether Church, Gooel, Brouwer, Schefer, Montague, or Foucaulc (to take a very 
different example) are really philosophers, though some of them taught in philosophy 
departments. The dispute over cases like these (particularly the former cases) tends to 26
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be hoc for ic touches nerves abouc what philosophy reaJly is or should be. 
Indeed, for che most paro pru, even the securest pan of the canon is noc ennrely safe. 
Some mighc argue that Plato is really more of a sage than a phtlosopher. He should, m 
a way he standardly is not, be classified with Nieu.sche or perhaps Hegel as a sage (m 
Hegel's case an o�ure and pompous sage) who cold big tales of a Welumschauungish 
nature and not with Aristotle and Descartes who are plainly philosophers. And some 
might even say that Hobbes and Hume, as important as they are, should not be classified 
as philosophers but as social scientists with Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. To go 
contemporary, really partisan people (blclered dogmatists) would deny that Heidegger, 
Derrida or perhaps even Dewey are really philosophers while other panisans (equally 
blinkered dogmatists, though of a different sore} would deny thac Frege, Gooel, Church, 
Montague, or perhaps even T arsk.i are really philosophers. They are instead, such people 
would claim, formal scientists concerned with the (if there is such a thing) foundacioru 
of mathematics, logic, or the semantics of formal languages. But that, some would say, 
is not philosophy jusc as others would deny char what Heidegger and Derrida do is 
philosophy. 
I think panisanship pushed to such extremes is absurd. Yet it is also true that some 
chink that what Heidegger did or what Frege did is the really most crucial move in 
contemporary philosophy: a central turning point, while ochers chink of che curse of 
Heidegger or the curse of Frege. That is, they chink of one or another of these 
philosophers (usually not both, though I could understand a pragmatist thinking that) 
as talc.ing philosophy down the garden path. 
The above considerations were designed co show how impossible ic is to simply go 
descriptivist about what is philosophy. Philosophers deeply differ about their sulbject and, 
for most of them, it is important co chem what is thoughc here as can be seen from the 
fights, or near fights, which typically break out in philosophy departments when it comes 
to hiring a new member. More than competence, field, or (what presumably is a no,no 
but in reality is not) personality is typically at issue. 
Going purely prescriptive will not solve things eicher. "Rule out Hegel, Nietzsche, 
Foucault, and Derrida: banish them to the literature departments" or "Rule out Frege, 
Tarski, Montague� and Church: banish chem co the mathematics or linguistics depart, 
ments" does not solve anything either except practically. (Practically because it is 
important thac all of these people get studied in universities. In whac departments they 
are studied is less important.} 
Where prescriptions are given reasons need to be given for chem if they are not co be 
purely arbitrary and the giving of reasons will tum on beliefs about what is really 
important or desirable in philosophy or about what can reasonably be done in philosophy, 
given what we know now or can reasonably believe and whac our situation is. le seems 
that philosophy isn't essentially anything, there being no thoroughly uncontestable 
answers to what the function or functions of philosophy is. (Indeed it may not even have 
a function .) So what is essential to argue is (a) about what really is (if anything) important 
and desirable about philosophy ("philosophy" unavoidably construed in some decenni, 
nate way or other) and (b} what can be done in philosophy, given our situation and what 
we can know now or can reasonably believe. Perhaps there are and can be no tolerably 
objec cive answers to those two questions. But chat cannot be reasonably accepted a priori 
or taken as something which is just plainly so. 
Perhaps, given this state of affairs, some rational reconstruction of philosophy ·is possible 
and desirable. To employ a method of rational reconstruction is neither simply to 
prescribe nor simply to describe. A rational reconstruction of philosophy will not apply 27
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co everything which has previously gone under the name of philosophy. Rational 
reconstructions are in pan prescriprionist buc not arbitrarily so and they will leave intact 
considerable segments of what (now speaking descriptively} had previously been widely 
regarded as philosophy. The rational reconsrructionist will argue that unless some 
prescriptive restrictions are made one will noc be able co demarcate philooophy from 
other forms of iinquiry or reflective activities or articulations of Welcanschau ng. In 
demarcating philosophy more precisely, say, from science, literature, religion, or pure 
sag,ery, the rational reconstructor calls artention co differences. But in rationally 
reconstructing she will at least keep the most central figures of the canon: Placo, 
Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Descanes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Kant ., and Hegel 
and she will tTy to show what (if indeed there is any determinate thing) about them that 
makes us quite unequivocally classify all of them as philosophers. With this in hand, we 
will be in a somewhat better position to know, with respect to disputed figures, e.g., 
Kierkegaard, Herder, Smith, Ferguson, Nietzsche, Marx, Thales, whom to include and 
whom to exclude from the canon. 
Tbere will, of course, be dispute about when a reconstruction is rationlll, for how 
rationality is to be conceived is itself a deeply contested notion. Moreover. answering 
these questions of rational reconstruction seems at least to require some plausible answer 
co our previous questions (a) and (b): co wit, answers co questions about what (if 
anything) is really important about philosophy and what can be done in philosophy, 
given our situation and what we can know now or can reasonably believe. (lbe rwo 
cannot, of course, be answered independently of each other.) Perhaps there is no 
consensus or even a reasonable basis for a consensus here. If that is so, then the prospects 
for a rational reconstruction of philosophy are bleak. 25 
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